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Revisiting Congressional Delegation of
Interpretive Primacy as the Foundation
for Chevron Deference
Mark Seidenfeld*

Although congressional delegation is the rationale used most
often to justify the Chevron doctrine, most scholars who have
written about this justiﬁcation have recognized that it is a
ﬁction, albeit, they claim, a useful one. In “Chevron’s Foundation,” I proposed an alternative foundation for the Chevron
doctrine—a judicial self-limitation justiﬁcation for Chevron
deference—based on an implicit understanding of Article III
that courts should not resolve cases by making policy choices
where alternative means for deciding these cases exists. In this
essay, I ﬁrst revisit my original critique of the delegation rationale and explicitly respond to the arguments for that foundation that were published after my prior work on Chevron.
Although I think that these arguments muddy the waters
regarding congressional delegation by providing evidence that
there are at least some cases in which Congress purposely
means to grant agencies interpretive primacy, I conclude that
this is still unlikely to be true with respect to most statutory
ambiguities, and hence that in most cases such delegation is
still a ﬁction. I then proceed to consider how the rejection
of congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy to
agencies bears on the judicial developments in the application
of Chevron that post-date my prior work.

* Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State University Col
lege of Law. Thanks to Megan Bradley for her help with research on this paper.
© 2017 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 978-0-226-438184/2017/0024-0001$10.00

3

All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

4

Revisiting Congressional Delegation of Interpretive Primacy for Chevron

1. INTRODUCTION
The most commonly accepted justiﬁcation for the Chevron doctrine
hinges on congressional assignment to an agency of the function of interpreting a statute that the agency is authorized to implement (see
Rodriguez, Stiglitz, and Weingast 2015).1 Chevron itself indicated that
when Congress leaves a gap in a statutory provision and authorizes
the agency to take action to implement that provision, it has implicitly “delegated” interpretive primacy—the role of resolving the statutory ambiguity—to the agency (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 [1984]).2 This part of the Chevron opinion
suggests that the courts are to defer to the agency resolution of the ambiguity because that was the intention of Congress, as evidenced by the
language and structure of the statute, canons of interpretation, and for
non-textualists, perhaps its legislative history (see Chevron, 467 U.S.
837; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 [1987]).). In United
States v. Mead Corp., (533 U.S. 218 [2001]), the Court further expounded
on this notion of congressional delegation, stating that intent to delegate cannot be inferred unless the agency interprets the statute in exercise of statutory authorization to act with the force of law. In short,
the Supreme Court has suggested that, by leaving a statutory provision
ambiguous and granting the administering agency authority to take action with the force of law, Congress has implicitly delegated the job of
1
See Rodriguez, Stiglitz, and Weingast (2015), who stated, “Doctrinally, the conceit
underlying the Chevron doctrine is that an ambiguity in the statute represents an im
plicit delegation by Congress to agencies.” Gluck (2014) suggests, “[O]ne way to under
stand the march from Chevron to Mead is as an evolution from a broad and ambiguously
justiﬁed approach to delegation to one focused on one particular justiﬁcation congres
sional intent to delegate grounded in legislative reality.” See also Merrill (2004).
2
The Court explained in Chevron (467 U.S. at 843 44) that “if Congress has explicitly
left a gap for the agency to ﬁll, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency
to elucidate a speciﬁc provision of the statute by regulation” (467 U.S. at 843 44). Many
scholars mirror Chevron’s confounding of delegation of policymaking authority and in
terpretive primacy by describing this justiﬁcation as congressional “delegation” of the in
terpretive function. For example, Gersen and Vermeule (2012) state that in “Mead Corp.,
the Supreme Court clariﬁed that the Chevron doctrine rests on Congress’s implicit dele
gation of law interpreting authority to agencies.” Healy (2002) further describes Mead in
terms of congressional delegation of interpretive primacy to the courts versus agencies. I
dislike this term because one usually can only delegate a power one has, and Congress
does not have interpretive authority with respect to statutes it has enacted. But, in its
lawmaking function, it seems correct to say that Congress can assign primary responsi
bility to resolve statutory silence or ambiguity to particular institutions with the other
branches of government, and this ﬁrst justiﬁcation for Chevron depends on the court ﬁnd
ing an implicit assignment of that responsibility to the agency administering the statute.
Despite my dislike for the term “delegation,” I refer to this justiﬁcation as based on “dele
gation of interpretive primacy” to render this article consistent with the prevailing termi
nology in the literature.
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resolving the statutory ambiguity to the agency acting pursuant to that
statutory grant of authority (Mead, 533 U.S. 218 [2001]).
Although congressional delegation is the rationale used most often
to justify the Chevron doctrine, most scholars who have written about
this justiﬁcation have recognized that it is a ﬁction, albeit, they claim,
a useful one.3 As I pointed out in my earlier article on Chevron’s foundation, in actuality, it is not true that authorizing the agency to act
where such action requires resolution of the ambiguity necessarily implies an expectation that the agency resolution will bind a reviewing
court (Seidenfeld 2011). For example, lower court judges interpret statutory provisions all the time, and if a particular case interpreting a statute is not appealed, that interpretation binds the parties to the case and
sets precedent as to the meaning of the statutory provision at issue.
Nonetheless, it is universally accepted that appellate courts are not
to give deference to lower courts on interpretations of law (see Anderson 2012; Frisch 2003, 77; Gugliuzza 2013). Moreover, in most cases,
there is no indication in the relevant statutory provisions or legislative
history that anyone in Congress considered whether to delegate interpretive primacy to the agency that administers the statute.
In “Chevron’s Foundation” (Seidenfeld 2011), I proposed an alternative foundation for the Chevron doctrine—a judicial self-limitation
justiﬁcation for Chevron deference—based on an implicit understanding of Article III that Courts should not resolve cases by making policy
choices where alternative means for deciding these cases exists.4 With
respect to review of agency interpretations of the statutes they administer, deferring to a reasonable agency interpretation provides such an
alternative. Since I published “Chevron’s Foundation,” however, there
has been some new scholarship that purports to bolster the congressional delegation justiﬁcation by arguing that such delegation is generally
not a ﬁction. In addition, there have been several judicial developments
3
See, for example, Merrill and Hickman (2001), stating, “Thus, Chevron’s attribu
tion of a general intention to Congress that agencies by the front line interpreters of
regulatory statues has been described by even its strongest defender as ‘ﬁctional.’ In
the end, however, we think that the congressional intent theory is the best.” Merrill
(1992) further explains, “Chevron in effect adopted a ﬁction that assimilated all cases
involving statutory ambiguities or gaps into the express delegation or ‘legislative rule’
model.” Scalia (1989) also touted Chevron because it “is unquestionably better than
what preceded it. Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether inten
tionally or unintentionally, will be resolved within the bounds of permissible inter
pretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency.”
4
John Manning (1996) has also rejected congressional delegation as the justiﬁca
tion for Chevron, relying instead on Article III of the Constitution’s vesting executive
authority in the President. Both Manning and I essentially rely on the fact that inter
preting statutory provisions that are silent or ambiguous essentially is making policy,
for which the judiciary is not the ideal institution of government.
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in applying Chevron that depend on whether congressional delegation
of interpretive primacy actually justiﬁes the doctrine.
In this essay, I ﬁrst revisit my original critique of the delegation rationale as the foundation of Chevron deference and explicitly respond
to the arguments for that foundation that were published after my prior
work on Chevron. Although I think that these arguments muddy the
waters regarding congressional delegation by providing evidence that
there are at least some cases in which Congress purposely means to
grant agencies interpretive primacy, I conclude that this is still unlikely
to be true with respect to most statutory ambiguities, and hence in most
cases, such delegation is still a ﬁction. I then proceed to consider how
the rejection of congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy
to agencies bears on the judicial developments in the application of
Chevron that post-date my prior work.

2. THE NEW CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATION OF INTERPRETIVE PRIMACY
For the typical agency-authorizing statute that creates an interpretive
gap—that is, when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
some precise interpretive question—there is no explicit indication in
the statute or its legislative history that Congress meant to grant the implementing agency interpretive primacy (see Seidenfeld 2011; Barron
and Kagan 2001). Perhaps the most convincing argument that authorization of agency action that requires resolution of statutory ambiguity
implicitly delegates interpretive primacy stems from the Court’s creation of the Chevron doctrine itself, and the universal acceptance of
that doctrine by the lower courts and subsequent Supreme Court cases.
Once the Court announced Chevron, one can argue that Congress should
have known that any statutory ambiguity would be construed as imbuing
the administering agency with interpretive primacy when acting with
the force of law. Thus, the argument proceeds, at least for statutes enacted against the backdrop of the Chevron doctrine, that one can reasonably presume congressional knowledge that courts will grant agencies
interpretive primacy and hence that Congress can be said to have intended to grant this primacy. This justiﬁcation, however, is circular
and cannot justify the Chevron doctrine in the ﬁrst instance. Thus
the justiﬁcation only works for statutes enacted after the Supreme Court
decided Chevron.
Even leaving aside this temporal limitation, however, for the delegation justiﬁcation to have force, Congress must have been aware of the
Chevron backdrop for a reviewing court to conclude that Congress expected the agency to resolve statutory ambiguity. When I wrote “Chev-
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ron’s Foundation” (Seidenfeld 2011), such congressional awareness was
by no means obvious. Since then, however, Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman (2013; 2014) have conducted a massive survey of congressional
staff members involved in drafting of legislation about how such staff
members go about their task. Gluck and Bressman (2013; 2014) asked
about the awareness of legislative staff with various judicial tools of
statutory construction, such as linguistic and substantive canons. They
reported that 88 percent of their respondents told them “that the authorization of notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . is always or often
relevant to whether drafters intend for an agency to have gap-ﬁlling
authority” (Gluck and Bressman 2013). Gluck and Bressman’s results
on this point suggest that at least by 2013, lack of congressional awareness of Chevron was not a persuasive criticism of the delegation justiﬁcation for the Chevron doctrine.5
Congressional awareness of the Chevron doctrine, however, does
not necessarily imply a desire for that doctrine to control review of
statutory interpretation. Gluck and Bressman’s own survey reveals
that there are numerous reasons why Congress might enact an ambiguous statutory provision, and delegating interpretive primacy to the
agency that administers the statute is not the reason most commonly
given by survey respondents (Gluck and Bressman 2013). Legislators
might have a particular meaning of the provision in mind and might
be unaware of an alternative meaning that an agency or reviewing
court might ﬁnd (see Seidenfeld [2014], discussing hidden statutory
ambiguity). Or one resolution of an ambiguous statutory provision
might impose costs on a focused interest group, while alternative resolution might impose such costs on a different powerful group. In such
a situation, resolution of the ambiguity will engender blame by some
interest group, and legislators might prefer to punt on the issue, avoiding such blame by having a different institution such as the courts
or the agency that administers the statute resolve the ambiguity (see
Rodriguez 1992).6 It is possible that legislators who vote for the legislation might prefer resolution by the courts rather than by an administering agency, especially if government is divided. The party in con-

5
I would note, however, that Gluck and Bressman’s conclusion is clouded by the
fact that “gap ﬁlling authority” could be understood to mean authority to adopt rules
to ﬁll legislative gaps, rather than to ﬁll such gaps by statutory interpretation.
6
Rodriguez (1992) explains, “[S]tatutory ambiguity . . . . is but one facet of legisla
tors’ interests in claiming credit for addressing the demands of interest groups by en
acting a statute . . . while simultaneously shifting blame for a future interpretation of
the statute to another institution.”). See also Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) for a de
scription of the costs and beneﬁts to the legislator of delegating policymaking author
ity to agencies.
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trol of Congress often will wish not to provide leeway for the executive branch to implement the agenda of the opposition party.
Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, the legislative process is noteworthy for
its inertia. A majority of the members of Congress might prefer not to
grant the agency interpretive primacy, and hence might have an incentive to clarify any ambiguous provision, but they might simply be unable to marshal support to overcome the procedural hurdles to enact a
clarifying amendment to the bill. Inability to clarify ambiguous language alone, however, often will not result in the death of the bill during the legislative process. Congress might believe that the statute is
worthwhile (however the ambiguity is resolved) and therefore might
choose to roll the dice with the ambiguous provision. In other words,
even if a majority of the members of each house of Congress would prefer that the courts resolve the ambiguity rather than the administering agency, they might nonetheless value passage of the bill sufﬁciently
to warrant enacting it into law even though the agency will have interpretive primacy over the ambiguous provision. Therefore, the mere existence of statutory authority to act with the force of law when such
action would require interpretation of the statutory provision at issue
need not imply intent to delegate interpretive primacy to an agency.
Implied delegation of interpretive primacy, however, might follow
from the generally accepted understanding that Congress can prescribe
how courts should read statutes, which follows from Congress’s general
power to create law as it sees ﬁt (see Rosenkranz 2002).7 This understanding frees Congress from having to choose between ambiguity,
which might be preferred for some reason unrelated to the standard
of judicial review, and triggering Chevron review. If Congress enacts
an ambiguous statutory provision and does not intend to delegate interpretive primacy to the administering agency, it can substitute another standard of review for the Chevron doctrine or simply provide
that Chevron does not apply. If Congress is aware that it can overrule
the application of Chevron, then one might infer that its failure to do
so even in the face of a statutory provision evidences an intent to have
Chevron apply. Again, however, this argument only supports congressional delegation of interpretive primacy as the foundation of Chevron if Congress is aware of its ability to codify a different standard than
Chevron. And, until 2010, Congress had never provided an exception to

7
Some have questioned whether Rosenkranz’s position is consistent with the
structure of our Constitution and separation of powers (Jellum 2009; see also Alexan
der and Prakash 2003). But as long as the courts are free to interpret provisions with
the standards of judicial review for executive statutory interpretation, such provisions
seem to ﬁt comfortably within the legislative power to prescribe secondary rules of
adjudication under Article II’s necessary and proper clause.
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Chevron, which probably means that it did not think about, let alone
intend to impose, the Chevron doctrine on reviewing courts.8
Kent Barnett (2015) has noted, however, that in the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress enacted an unprecedented provision instructing courts essentially to apply Skidmore rather than Chevron deference when reviewing decisions of the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
that preempt state law. “Congress ﬁrst abrogated what it considered the
OCC’s broader preemption standards by expressly codifying the narrower
Barnett Bank standard for the preemption of state laws that directly
regulate consumer-ﬁnancial transactions” (Barnett 2015). Dodd-Frank
then provided: “When reviewing the OCC’s preemption determinations, courts shall ‘assess the validity of such determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency,
the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other
valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the
court ﬁnds persuasive and relevant to its decision’” (Barnett 2015 [quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012)]). From this provision, Barnett (2015)
concludes that Congress does have an intent about granting interpretive primacy to agencies. He then goes on to analyze this single instance when Congress exercised its control over the standard of review
of agency statutory interpretation to conclude that Congress often does
not intend to grant agencies such primacy merely by leaving statutory
language silent or ambiguous. 9
Certainly Barnett is right that Congress’s exercise of its prerogative
to specify the standard of review of agency interpretation muddies the argument that congressional intent about interpretive primacy is a ﬁction.
At least with respect to the provisions in Dodd-Frank that addressed
review of OCC interpretations regarding preemption, the text of the
statute clearly indicates an “intent” to replace Chevron with Skidmore
deference. But Barnett reads one instance of Congress exercising this
prerogative for far more than it is worth. He assumes that because the

8
One might conclude that failure to override the Chevron standard supports that
Congress preferred Chevron review so uniformly that it never felt the need to prescribe
a deviation from that standard. But, given the controversy that surrounded the Chevron
doctrine, Congress’s lack of awareness of its ability to override Chevron better explains
this history.
9
Dodd Frank took effect on July 21, 2010 (Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Con
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111 203, 124 Stat. 1376, [July 21, 2010]). Barnett notes
that Dodd Frank’s codiﬁcation of the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines was unprece
dented, and he seems to concede that that codiﬁcation does not provide insight about
Congress’s state of mind before 2010 (Barnett 2015). Although “Chevron’s Foundation”
was published in early 2011, after Dodd Frank was enacted, it was written before that
enactment, and I and many others were not aware of the statute’s explicit override of
Chevron review.
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legislature was aware that it could maintain statutory ambiguity without granting interpretative primacy in this one instance evidences that
Congress is generally aware and concerned about such primacy whenever it legislates. Leaving review provisions unspeciﬁed, Barnett (2015)
concludes, indicates congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy to the agency.10
Congress, however, is not a monolithic institution for which awareness of the potential to specify a standard of review in one particular
context indicates such an awareness for matters addressed by different
staff members in different contexts. Again, the Gluck and Bressman
survey is noteworthy for the variability of percentages of staff that were
knowledgeable about different judicial tools of interpretation (Gluck
and Bressman 2013). And Dodd-Frank itself was an outlier—a statute
that in relevant parts reﬂected extreme distrust of the OCC implementation of preemption and perhaps of ﬁnancial regulation generally. In
such a situation, Congress was primed to ﬁnd ways to restrict agency
interpretive discretion, and hence for the ﬁrst time it used an explicit
override of Chevron deference.
The inclusion of an explicit override of Chevron deference in this situation says little about the awareness of congressional staff, let alone
members of Congress, that it could provide such overrides generally.
The fact that Congress not only had never utilized an explicit override
before, but to the best of my knowledge has never proposed such an
override or even discussed it as a possibility in legislative history either
before or after enacting Dodd-Frank, suggests to me that members of
Congress generally do not envision this approach to limiting the delegation of interpretive primacy courts infer from statutory ambiguity.
Moreover, this is not a decision about how to word a statute to achieve
its intended effects. Rather, whether to override Chevron would be a
substantive decision rather than one of clarity and style that might be
reﬂect the choice of the Ofﬁce of Legislative Counsel. Congress’s substantive committees generally will decide whether to include such a provision. And the core of statutes addressing different regulatory schemes
are drafted by different committees with different staffs. Thus, the fact
that some staff members of one committee were aware of Congress’s
ability to specify the standard of interpretive review says little about the

10
According to Barnett (2015), “Dodd Frank supports the delegation theory by sug
gesting that congressional delegation is not ﬁctional and that Congress has acquiesced
to the Chevmore doctrines. More speciﬁcally, Dodd Frank suggests that Congress does
in fact have intent as to interpretative primacy, generally accepts juridical deference to
agency interpretations and the Chevmore regimes, and uses Chevron as a background
norm when drafting.”
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staffs of other committees, let alone the understanding of the members
of Congress themselves.
Even if Congress were well aware of the possibility of explicitly overriding Chevron review, the fact that any particular statute does not
do so often still would not reﬂect the intent of a majority of the legislature. The judiciary has set Chevron review as the default for statutory provisions that judges ﬁnd silent or ambiguous. As Adrian Vermeule
has noted, “Where the default rule is that Congress can only retaliate
through positive action, the costs of collective action make the default
of institutional inertia difﬁcult to overcome” (Vermeule 2013).11 Hence,
even in the face of ambiguity, the failure to specify an alternative to
Chevron might simply reﬂect an inability to overcome the Chevron
default rule.12 To put the point bluntly, if the Court had provided Skidmore rather than Chevron deference as the default rule for reviewing
agency interpretations of their authorizing statutes, the same Congress
that failed to replace Chevron with Skidmore review under current law
most likely would have left the Skidmore default standard in place.
3. THE MAJOR-QUESTION EXCEPTION
TO CHEVRON DEFERENCE
One recent development of the Chevron doctrine is the “major question” exception to Chevron deference.13 Whether that exception is justiﬁed, and how it should operate, depends to a great extent on one’s view
of Chevron’s foundation. The Supreme Court has suggested that it is
inappropriate for courts to presume that Congress would have granted
an agency interpretive primacy over questions that potentially could
have huge effects on the nation or major statutory programs.14
11
Seidenfeld (2004) also argues that leaving decisions for Congress under a penalty
default canon will likely induce congressional inaction. For a general explanation of
congressional inertia and its likely effects on promulgation of legislation, see Stephen
son (2008).
12
Ernie Young (2001) made a similar argument about why a presumption against
federal preemption leads to fewer statutes that preempt state law, stating, “The presump
tion against preemption thus makes it harder to preempt state law [because] the burden
of speaking clearly ex ante or, if necessary, overcoming legislative inertia to amend a stat
ute ex post is born by the proponents of preemption.”
13
Cass Sunstein (2006) seems to have ﬁrst coined the term “major question excep
tion.”
14
Few if any scholars support the major questions exception as the Court has de
veloped it, but some do support similar proposals based on the judicial role of inter
preting the basic structure of administrative statutes (see, for example, Gifford 2007)
or based on arguments that agencies should not interfere in the congressional resolu
tion of salient political issues (see, for example, Moncrieff 2008). More recent scholar
ship has accepted the doctrine, but has sought to limit its applicability. For example,
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3.1. Supreme Court Development of the Major-Question
Exception to Chevron
The Supreme Court developed the doctrine in series of highly signiﬁcant cases in which it reviewed agency interpretations of their authorizing statutes. The majority opinions in these cases uncritically accept
the congressional delegation justiﬁcation of Chevron deference. But as
discussion of this development will make clear, a major-question exception to Chevron does not ﬁt easily with the delegation justiﬁcation
without further, even less founded assumptions about the contours of
congressional intent to assign interpretive primacy to agencies.
The ﬁrst case to hint at the major-question exception, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co. (512 U.S. 218 [1994]), involved a
construction of a Federal Communication Act provision allowing the
Federal Communications Commission to “modify” statutory requirements of Title II of the Act imposes on telecommunications providers.
When the Act was enacted, telecommunication companies were natural monopolies because of the economics of laying telephone cable to
tie users into the network. The structure of the Act generally treated
such providers as common carriers and required that they ﬁle tariffs
governing the rates and terms under which they provide service. The
tariffs took effect only after Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
approval.
In the 1980s it became clear with the long distance telephone offerings of MCI and Sprint that the assumption that long-distance telephone communication was a natural monopoly was no longer universally true.15 Nonetheless, AT&T still retained a monopoly over much
of the market. To foster competition, the FCC used its authority to
“modify” Title II of the FCA to exempt long distance providers with
less than 50 percent market share from having to ﬁle tariffs and get them
approved. Essentially, the FCC authorized competitors of AT&T to provide such service on an entirely deregulated basis, contrary to the long
understood structure of the Act.
Emerson (forthcoming) stated that “[courts] should defer to the agency’s interpreta
tion only if: (1) it was promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking, or an
other procedure of comparable deliberative intensity; and (2) the relevant questions
of economic and political signiﬁcance the court identiﬁes have been properly ‘venti
lated’ and addressed in the deliberative process that precedes the promulgation of the
interpretation.”
15
While this is true, the deregulation of even long distance telephone service was
controversial because of the extent to which provision of such service was tied to local
telephone service, which remained a natural monopoly (see Kahn 1986). In fact, the de
regulation of long distance telephone service was prompted by an antitrust suit against
AT&T for failing to interconnect with companies authorized only to carry long distance
trafﬁc for essentially private networks (see Kahn 1986).
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Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court reversing this FCC order (512 U.S. 218). The opinion applied the Chevron framework but
reversed the agency at step one. For the most part the opinion relied
on a textual reading of the word “modify” to mean a moderate change.
It reasoned that the FCC change was such a departure from the original understanding of the Act’s regulatory provision that it did not constitute a “modiﬁcation” of the Act but rather a wholesale change, and
hence it was beyond the authority the Act delegated to the FCC (see
Kahn 1986). After reaching that conclusion, which was sufﬁcient to
justify the holding of the Court, Scalia added, “It is highly unlikely
that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry
will be entirely, or even substantially, rate regulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such
a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-ﬁling requirements”
(512 U.S. at 231). Thus, Scalia relied on the fundamental nature of
the legal authority at issue to presume that Congress would not have left
the agency free to relieve regulated entities of what previously had been
fundamental requirements imposed by the statute.
In the second “majority question” case, FDA v. Brown & Williamson, Corp. (529 U.S. 120 [2000]), the Supreme Court reversed the agency
interpretation of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to cover cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as drug delivery devices to deliver nicotine. Again, the agency applied the Chevron doctrine and reversed at
step one. The plain meaning of the statute seems to cover nicotine as
drug, and the question on which the agency determination of whether cigarettes and smokeless tobacco were delivery devices hinged on whether
they were “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had determined that these
companies manipulated the nicotine content of tobacco to deliver a speciﬁc dose of that drug and thus were subject to the Act.16
The Court relied on the presumption announced in MCI as the central basis of its determination that Congress did not intend to FDCA to
cover tobacco products. The Court noted that prior to the decision under review, the FDA had consistently denied authority to regulate tobacco products, and Congress had repeatedly provided for regulation
of them by the Surgeon General warnings, rather than having granted
the FDA such authority. The majority stated, “Contrary to its representations before Congress, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate a signiﬁcant portion of the American economy. . . . We are conﬁdent that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of
such economic and political signiﬁcance to an agency in so cryptic a
16
For a fascinating account of how the FDA decided to issue the regulations of tobacco
products that were reviewed in Brown & Williamson, see generally Kessler (2001).

All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

14

Revisiting Congressional Delegation of Interpretive Primacy for Chevron

fashion” (529 U.S. at 158). Thus because of the signiﬁcance of the interpretation at issue, the Court presumed that the statute did not grant
the agency the authority to regulate tobacco, denying the agency the
Chevron deference that would ordinarily apply in the face of a statute
that, on its face, seemed to support the agency interpretation.
The third major-question case, King v. Burwell (135 S. Ct. 2480 [2015]),
involved whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
authorized tax credits to individuals who purchased health insurance
on state exchanges that had been established and that were operated
by the federal government. The Internal Revenue Service interpreted
the statute (77 Fed. Reg. 30,378 [2012]) to authorize such credits. The
ACA section on how to calculate these credits, however, indicated that
they were to be calculated based on the cost of benchmark plans on an
insurance “Exchange established by a State” (26 U.S.C. §§ 36(b)–(c)). Although this seems to provide a straightforward answer to the question
of whether subsidies were available on federally established exchanges,
the text of the statute also provided that if a state did not establish an
exchange, the federal government was to establish “such Exchange”
within the state, suggesting that a federally created exchange within a
state essentially was an “Exchange established by a State” for all purposes under ACA (see Seidenfeld 2014).
The majority stated that “[w]hether those credits are available on
Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep economic and political signiﬁcance that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished
to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly” (135 S. Ct. at 2489). The Court thus held, at the outset of the
opinion, that the matter was not subject to the Chevron doctrine at all.
The Court went on to determine denying tax credits on federally created exchanges would potentially undermine the operation of insurance markets in those states that did not establish their own exchanges
and that the overall structure and language of the statute did not indicate that Congress intended such a perverse outcome.17 The King majority thus interpreted the statute in the same manner as the agency—
reading “Exchange established by a State” to include those established
by the federal government, albeit paying no regard to the agency’s interpretation.18
17
In the words of the Court, “the statutory scheme compels the Court to reject
petitioners’ interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance mar
ket in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that
Congress designed the Act to avoid” (King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484).
18
The Court invoked a major question exception to the usual operation in a fourth
case, Utility Regulatory Air Group v. EPA (134 S. Ct. 2427 [2014]). In that case, despite
the language of the Clean Air Act seeming to include greenhouse gasses as pollution that
should trigger regulation as a criteria pollutant, the Court held that the term air pollu
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3.2. The Major-Question Exception and Congressional
Interpretive Delegation
The language of all of the Supreme Court’s major-question-exception
opinions rely on the supposition that Congress would not have intended
to give the relevant agency the authority to read the statute to trigger
regulation that would affect the national economy in such fundamental
ways. Implicit in the opinions is the assumption that Congress would
prefer to make decisions of great national signiﬁcance itself. That assumption, however, is ﬂawed because when a case arises involving the
meaning of a statute, Congress’s role is long done. Congress generally
cannot amend the statute in time to decide the case. If the statute does
not clearly resolve the issue raised by the case, interpreting the meaning of the statute will fall either on an agency implementing the statute by adopting a rule or adjudicating a particular matter or on the
courts (see Sunstein 2006; Moncrieff 2008; Emerson, forthcoming).19
Viewed from this perspective, the Court’s assertion that Congress
would not leave interpretations that involve major questions to agencies is hard to justify. At the outset, it bears emphasizing that the Court
cites nothing indicating that Congress harbors such intent. Moreover,
the institutional relationship of Congress to the courts relative to its
relationship with the executive branch, would suggest that Congress
would prefer that agencies have primary responsibilities for such interpretations.
The means by which agencies can inﬂuence courts are few and weak;
the means by which Congress can inﬂuence agency action are more
numerous and stronger.20 First, Congress can override interpretations

tion for regulation of stationary sources was not the same as the air pollution under the
general regulatory authority of the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). The case is
very similar to Brown & Williamson in that the majority interpreted the statute con
trary to the seeming plain meaning of the text because that would have triggered an enor
mous increase in the scope of the Clean Air Act and the EPA’s regulatory authority under
that Act. Even the EPA recognized that regulating CO2 as a criteria pollutant using the
statute’s triggers for when sources would have to obtain pollution emission permits
would be impracticable. The agency tried to solve this impracticality by adopting the
“tailoring rule,” increasing the level of pollution that would trigger permitting require
ments for CO2 by a factor of about 1,000. The Court held that the EPA could not simply
replace the numerical limits speciﬁed by the statute with those the agency thought more
sensible. The Court further held that Congress would not have meant to increase the
EPA’s regulatory authority to the extent that would occur if greenhouse gasses were cri
teria pollutants without providing clear language of that intent (134 S. Ct. at 2443).
19
Lemos (2008) also notes that by not delegating interpretive authority to an agency,
Congress essentially delegates such authority to the courts.
20
Pierce (2012) states, “Congress has more power over agencies than any other in
stitution.”
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with which it disagrees by enacting legislation.21 But the Constitution’s
requirement of bicameralism and presentment purposely creates signiﬁcant inertia opposing statutory change.22 The same process, of course,
limits congressional override of an agency interpretation by statutory
enactment (see Seidenfeld [2001], for a description of why statutory
overrides of agency rules are difﬁcult and uncommon). And one might
reason that such override is a less meaningful check on agency decisions because usually the decisions are supported by the White House,
and hence the threat of a presidential veto of an override of administrative interpretation is great. To illustrate this, assume for simplicity
that arguments on the merits for alternative interpretations of a particular statutory matter are of equal weight. Judicial interpretation in
such a case is equally likely to come out contrary to the president’s preferred position as consistent with that position. Thus the likelihood
of presidential veto of an override of a judicial interpretation is 50∶50,
which for the reason just given is less than that for an administrative
interpretation. That reasoning, however, is ﬂawed. Assuming that Congress is not interested in an interpretation merely because it is opposite
to that preferred by the president,23 the only situations in which Congress would be concerned about a presidential veto is when the Capitol
and the White House differ on their preferred interpretations. And within
this universe of interpretations, a “rational” president would be just as
likely to veto an override of an interpretation that comes from the courts
as from an administrative agency.24
21
Hasen (2013) notes that congressional overrides of Supreme Court interpretations
have greatly decreased recently. Christiansen and Eskridge (2014, 131) ﬁnd that the
number of congressional overrides of judicial interpretations varies greatly over various
time periods.
22
Rick Hasen (2013) has postulated that, today, overrides are partisan in nature
and are more likely to occur when a party controls both Congress and the presidency,
but judges are more aligned with the opposing party.
23
In the current era of hyper partisanship and divided government, it may be that Con
gress opposes an interpretation that its members believe to further the public interest
simply to deny the president the ability to claim a policy achievement. See Mann and
Ornstein (2013) who explain, “[T]he single minded focus on scoring political points over
solving problems, escalating over the last several decades, has reached a level of such in
tensity and bitterness that the government seems incapable of taking and sustaining pub
lic decisions responsive to the existential challenges facing the country.” Although that
may be the reality in our current era of a dysfunctional Congress, I consider opposition
purely for the sake of promoting a legislator’s party illegitimate, and hence celebrate
the potential for greater space for Chevron deference to undermine this hyper partisan
legislative interest.
24
I use the term “rational” to limit my consideration to actions that promote the pol
icy outcomes the president prefers. I therefore discount the possibility that the president
will support an agency position with which he disagrees as a matter of policy merely to
show support for members of his administrative team. I do not deny that a president may
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Under current legislative rules, override of an agency interpretation
may actually be easier than override of a judicial one. In addition to the
bicameralism and presentment, the rules of the House and Senate create potential veto gates through which a bill must pass, and one of the
most signiﬁcant veto gate (especially in the Senate) is committee control over legislation (see Galle and Seidenfeld 2007). For major rules,
however, Congress enacted the Congressional Review Act (CRA)
(5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 [2012]), which allows members of either house
sixty legislative days from a rule’s publication to introduce a bill to override the rule. Under the CRA, once a bill is introduced, it bypasses the
committee system and potential ﬁlibuster, and it automatically gets considered by the full body of each legislative chamber (5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(b)).
Although one should not overstate the impact of the CRA because the
threat of presidential veto still looms large for overrides of major agency
rules, the CRA does make statutory override of a major agency interpretation a bit more likely than override of a judicial one.25
The other constitutionally speciﬁed mechanism for congressional
inﬂuence on both the judiciary and the agencies is the requirement that
appointments be made with the advice and consent of the Senate. Senate approval of a nomination applies to every federal judge and principal
ofﬁcer of the United States,26 but is not a particularly strong means of
congressional inﬂuence because it is episodic and, except possibly for
unique controversial interpretive issues under consideration when the
appointee is nominated, does not allow inﬂuence over speciﬁc interpretive questions. Each judge or ofﬁcial is approved only once—when
appointed. While such approval may be a meaningful check imposed
by the current majority of the Senate, it is not one that allows Congress
to monitor and inﬂuence decisions as the ideology of the majority of
the legislature changes and as issues unforeseen at the time of appointment arise. The one-time nature of approval of appointees especially
weakens the inﬂuence over judges, who are appointed for life. Con-

take support of his team into account in deciding policy positions he takes publicly, but I
doubt that a president is likely to do so with respect to an interpretation of any statutory
question a court is likely to deem major that is, an interpretation that will have sub
stantial and salient ramiﬁcations for the nation.
25
From its enactment in 1996 until the inauguration of President Trump, on Jan
uary 21, 2017, the Congressional Review Act had only been used once successfully to
fast track an override of an agency rule (see Nou and Stiglitz 2016). But there is every
indication that the Republican Congress will use it heavily to override several bills
adopted by agencies during the end of Obama’s presidency.
26
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 says, “He shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties . . . nominate ambassadors, other public min
isters and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other ofﬁcers of the United
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided.”
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gress may be a bit more apt to trust administrative ofﬁcers than judges
to interpret major statutory questions because the Senate is more likely
to have recently approved the ofﬁcial charged with interpretive responsibility and to have ensured, to the extent possible, that the ofﬁcial does
not interpret statutes contrary to the Senate’s preferences.
The Court’s implicit assertion that Congress would prefer courts to
interpret major questions is even more suspect when one considers nonconstitutionally speciﬁed mechanisms for congressional inﬂuence. The
two most signiﬁcant informal mechanisms are funding and direct committee oversight.
Although statutory overrides of agency interpretations by legislation
aimed exclusively at agency policy are rare, Congress not infrequently
uses the appropriation process to limit agency authority and sometimes
to enact riders that directly override agency policies reﬂected in rules.27
From Congress’s perspective, omnibus appropriations bills may be preferable vehicles for constraining agency policies to stand alone substantive bills because they present a dilemma for a president who does not
agree with the statutory limitation on the agency policy but who generally approves of the remainder of the appropriations bill.28 The president
must either veto the entire bill, sacriﬁcing those provisions with which
he agrees and potentially threatening a shutdown of government, or acquiesce in the limitation on the agency interpretation with which he
disagrees. The most common provision in an appropriation bill that limits an agency rule (which may encompass an interpretation with which
Congress disagrees) speciﬁes that the agency may not spend any of its
appropriation on implementing the offending interpretation.29 It would
be unfathomable for Congress to include a similar proviso in appropriations for the federal courts. The closest analogy would be for Congress
27
See Osofsky (2015), who argues, “Congress has tools at its disposal to respond to
categorical nonenforcement it dislikes”. Obviously, one mechanism by which agencies
create and implement policy is by interpretation of the statutes that create and deﬁne
the extent of agency authority. Thus, the appropriations process offers the same advan
tages from Congress’s perspective for overriding agency interpretations as it does for pol
icy more generally.
28
McGarity (2012a) argues that riders allow Congress to extort concessions out of
the executive branch because must pass legislation, such as appropriation bills, is too
important to veto, and this limits the president’s ability to exercise independent judg
ment concerning the substantive policies effectuated by the rider.
29
See Lazarus (2006), who explains, “The classic appropriation rider is negative in its
thrust and strictly pertains to the expenditure of funds. It declares that the agency may
not spend any of the monies Congress is appropriating to engage in a speciﬁc activity de
scribed in the legislation”. Devins (1987) also argues that Congress often uses limitation
riders to appropriation bills to accomplish policy directives on many topics including
public funding of abortion, air bags for automobiles, tax exemptions for discriminatory
schools, religious activities in schools, and many other areas.
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to withdraw from federal jurisdiction the authority to address issues
within some substantive area in order to prevent the courts from applying an interpretation that offends Congress. It is questionable whether
such substantive limits on jurisdiction are valid under Article III, at least
as applied to the Supreme Court (see Grove 2011; Hart 1953; Ratner
1960). And such jurisdictional limitations are so controversial that Congress rarely tries to use them.30 Politically, it would be much easier for
Congress to adopt overriding legislation than to limit Supreme Court
jurisdiction, which is almost certainly one reason that the few substantive limitations on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction that Congress has
attempted seek to nullify judicial opinions that decide constitutional
limits Congress’s authority.
Similarly, Congress not infrequently oversees agency policies by calling agency ofﬁcials to testify before congressional committees with jurisdiction over the agency’s programs (see Asimow and Levin 2009; Wright
2015; Lazarus 1991). Ostensibly meant for committees to inform themselves of regulatory matters, the oversight process has developed into a
means for the committee to communicate and develop constituent support for the legislature’s view 31 and saliently chastise agency ofﬁcials for
mistakes that the congressional committee claims they made.32 Generally, committee oversight implicitly threatens congressional opposition
to an agency’s agenda, which could result in efforts to cut the agency’s
statutory authority or budget (Seidenfeld 2001).33 More directly, appear30
See Grove (2011), who states, “Even when Congress has assembled sufﬁcient po
litical momentum to displace inferior federal court jurisdiction, it has consistently
left the Supreme Court’s appellate review power in place. . . . Congress has on only
two occasions eliminated the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”
31
See McGarity (2012b), who says, “[O]versight hearings allow inﬂuential members
of Congress to convey their preferences to agencies regarding particular rulemaking ini
tiatives.” Beermann (2006) also explains that “oversight hearings ‘provide an opportu
nity for members of Congress to express their views, often consisting of displeasure with
the agency’s performance, to agency personnel and the voting public.’ ”
32
For example, Boykin (2014) states, “For Democrats, this week’s Benghazi hearings
were not about the attack on the U.S. facility in Libya. Sixty four U.S. diplomatic facil
ities were attacked under President Bush and that prompted no similar outrage from Re
publicans. Instead, it was a G.O.P. ploy to score political points against President Obama
and his possible Democratic successor, Hillary Clinton.” See also The Washington Post
(2015). And Horowitz and Ed O’Keefe (2012) state, “ ‘Instead of going after guns, the Re
publican majority is going after the attorney general of the United States,’ Rep. Carolyn
B. Maloney (D N.Y.) told reporters. ‘This is a political witch hunt during the witch hunt
season, and the witch hunt season will probably not end until Election Day.’ ”
33
Beermann (2006) states, “[O]versight and supervision often take place with a threat
in the background that if an agency does not align its actions with the desires of legisla
tors, it will ﬁnd itself subject to legislation including changes to the substance of its pro
gram, changes to its structure, reductions or reallocations of its budget or targeted appro
priations riders.”
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ing before a congressional committee can generate bad press for agency
ofﬁcials.34 Thus, an ofﬁcial will work to avoid direct oversight if she is
either concerned about promoting her agency’s agenda, or has political
aspirations for the period after she steps down from ofﬁce. In either case,
the threat of agency hearings can inﬂuence an agency ofﬁcial to minimize any conﬂicts with the members of the committee that oversees
the agency’s functions.35 And as for use of appropriations bills to inﬂuence interpretation, a congressional committee would never call a sitting judge before the committee to chastise the judge for a decision he
reached, except perhaps as part of an effort to impeach the judge. That
would be political suicide.36
3.3. An Alternative Justiﬁcation for the Major-Question Exception
Overall, then, the assertion by the majority of the Supreme Court in
the major-question cases—that Congress would never leave discretion
to an agency to act in a manner that affects the nation’s economy or
ethos in a fundamental manner—would seem not to comport with Congress’s relative ability to inﬂuence agency interpretations vis-à-vis those
of the courts. But the alternative justiﬁcation for Chevron, premised
on relieving courts from making decisions of policy to the extent feasible under the structure of our Constitution, does no better in justifying the major-question exception. After all, if interpretation to ﬁll statutory gaps involves questions of policy (see Seidenfeld 2011), then it
hardly seems preferable to have courts become the primary interpreters of statutes when those questions of policy become more signiﬁcant
to the nation’s interest. If there is a justiﬁcation for the major-question
exception, it must depend on the legislature’s responsibility under Article I of the Constitution, and its implementation must somehow involve Congress in the interpretive process.
Some scholars have suggested that the major-question exception
can be grounded in Article I principles similar to those that underlie
the nondelegation doctrine.37 That doctrine asserts that to be consis34
Johnson (1992) explains, “Congress may conduct oversight hearings merely to
gain publicity. . . . For the agency . . . bad press is generated.”
35
“One prominent industry lobbyist observed in 2010 that ‘[i]f a regulator knows
they’re going to get yelled at on Capitol Hill, that inﬂuences their decisions’ ” (McGarity
2012b [citing Schwartz 2010 (quoting an industry source)]). See also Seidenfeld (2001).
36
Unless the committee members had supporters like those of President Trump,
who survived criticizing a judge as biased because he was a second generation Hispanic
(Steinhauer, Martin, and Herszerhorn 2016).
37
Sunstein (2006) makes this point but rejects this justiﬁcation because it poses
similar problems to those that plague any meaningful application of the nondelega
tion doctrine.
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tent with Article I, questions of fundamental policy must be made by
the legislature. In theory, therefore, it limits the ability of Congress to
delegate rulemaking authority to agencies. If a statute does so, it must
provide an intelligible principle to guide agency adoption of rules (Edwards 2016). But the nondelegation doctrine has proven unworkable in
practice.38 There is no objective means for courts to determine how
much statutory guidance is enough.39 Hence, except for two cases decided in 1935, just before “the switch in time that saved nine,” the Court
has never invalidated a delegation of policymaking to an agency (see
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 [1935]; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 [1935]).40
The major question suffers even more from the lack of any means to
determine what constitutes an interpretive question that cannot be
left to the agency (see Sunstein 2006). One cannot even formulate a
theoretical standard analogous to the intelligible principle for nondelegation, by which even to focus the judicial inquiry into what is a major question. Furthermore, unlike nondelegation, once Congress enacts a statute that seems to leave a major question for the agency, the
remedy for a violation of the doctrine is not invalidation of the statute,
leaving how to proceed in the hands of Congress. Rather, the alternative
is for the courts to decide the interpretive question. Thus the majorquestion exception simply replaces the delegation of policymaking from
agency to court, which seems at least as problematic from Article I principles that motivate both nondelegation and major-question concerns.
One other rationale that might justify the major-question exception
stems from the Supreme Court’s Brand X decision under the Chevron
doctrine. In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that an agency interpretation of a statute may take precedence over a prior inconsistent interpretation by a court (Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 [2005]). Brand X reasoned that if a statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to a particular interpretive question, then it is the role of the agency to interpret the statute as long as
38
See Bell (1999, 190 91), who concludes that the nondelegation doctrine is “ulti
mately unworkable.”
39
In his dissent in Mistretta v. United States (488 U.S. 361 [1989]), Justice Scalia
describes the debate over unconstitutional delegation as one of “degree” rather than
“principle.” Merrill (2004) further notes that the nondelegation doctrine is unwork
able because it requires courts to distinguish matters of degree.
40
The only two cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated a congressional del
egation of authority to an agency under the nondelegation doctrine are Panama Reﬁn
ing (293 U.S. 388) and Schechter Poultry (295 U.S. 495). The Court also invalidated a
delegation under the doctrine in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (298 U.S. 238 [1936]), but
that involved a delegation of rulemaking authority to a private organization, which
raises different issues from delegation to a federal agency.
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that interpretation is reasonable under step two of Chevron (Brand X,
545 U.S. at 986).41 This means that an agency interpretation is subject
to change by the agency. Given that agencies are free to be proactive with
respect to statutory interpretations—that is, unlike a court, an agency
does not have to wait for parties to bring a case or controversy before it
and is not bound by strict principles of stare decisis 42—Brand X opens
the potential for greater change in statutory interpretation than would
occur if courts had ultimate interpretive authority.43 For questions of
major signiﬁcance to the nation, the ability of the agency to vacillate
on its interpretation can impose signiﬁcant costs on those who have
to comply with the underlying statute. The major-question doctrine
molliﬁes the uncertainty created by ambiguous statutes by returning
ultimate decision-making authority to the courts, which are guided by
principles of stare decisis. But Chevron itself can handle this problem.
A court need only read step two of Chevron to require that the agency
justify its interpretation as a matter of policy, which would include the
requirement that the agency explain how its change in interpretation
affects reliance interests on the prior agency interpretation and why
the change is justiﬁed despite the interference with such reliance interests.44
There may be yet another justiﬁcation for the major-question exception—one that stems from canons of interpretation that scholars
have suggested, and courts have used, to bolster under-enforced constitutional norms. For example, Ernie Young (2000) has suggested that
the role of states in our system of federalism is under enforced because
it is not attached to many speciﬁc limitations on congressional action.
Therefore, he has suggested canons of interpretation that will protect
the regulatory prerogatives of state governments against federal encroachment unless Congress words a statute to clearly provide for interference with such prerogatives (Young 2000). A similar approach
could be used to reinforce the understanding under Article I of the
41
“At the ﬁrst step, we ask whether the statute’s plain terms ‘directly addres[s] the
precise question at issue.’ If the statute is ambiguous on the point, we defer at step two
to the agency’s interpretation so long as the construction is ‘a reasonable policy choice
for the agency to make’ ” (Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986 [citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843]).
42
An agency is free to change its position used to justify the outcome of a prior case
so long as explains why it believes the new agency’s new position is preferable to the
original one (see, e.g., Shaw’s Supermarkets Inc., v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34 [1st Cir. 1989)];
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 [2009]).
43
“Because an agency no longer can be bound by its (or a court’s) prior pronounce
ments, private parties now must confront a far less predictable regulatory landscape”
(Masur 2007).
44
See Part 4 of this paper, in which I discuss the question of whether Chevron’s
step two incorporates hard look review that would allow a court to demand consider
ation of such reliance interests from an agency change in interpretation.
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Constitution that fundamental policy choices are usually to be made
by Congress and not the executive branch.
As noted above, currently, this understanding is protected only by
the nondelegation doctrine, and that doctrine may be the most underenforced constitutional constraint.45 A presumption against rules that
implement fundamental changes in federal policy would bolster the
principle that Congress must make such fundamental policy choices
by forcing Congress to delegate such choices to an agency by a clear
statement when it enacts legislation if it means to allow the agency
to make fundamental policy.46 This will force Congress to confront
how it desires to handle such fundamental choices.
Bolstering the understanding that Congress is to make fundamental
policy choices unless it explicitly delegates that role to an agency, however, is controversial. At the broadest level, there are scholars and jurists
who object to presumptions and clear statement rules aimed at improving the transparency and deliberate nature of the legislative process.
These opponents of the under-enforced norms approach to statutory
interpretation see the courts, obligation as determining the constitutionality of a statute, and interpreting and enforcing it if it is constitutional (see, for example Manning 2010).47 With the under-enforced norms
45
See Sunstein (2000), who argues that the reported death of the nondelegation doc
trine is exaggerated but notes, “Since 1935, the Supreme Court has not struck down an
act of Congress on nondelegation grounds, notwithstanding the existence of a number
of plausible occasions”). See also Dep’t. of Transp. Ass’n of Am. R.R. (135 S. Ct. 1225
[2015]), which reversed 9 0 the DC Circuit’s use of the nondelegation doctrine, stating,
“[T]he formal reason why the Court does not enforce the nondelegation doctrine with
more vigilance is that the other branches of government have vested powers of their
own that can be used in ways that resemble lawmaking.”
46
The Court has recognized clear statement rules and similar interpretive presump
tions to protect other constitutional norms, such as federalism, state sovereign immu
nity, and avoidance of forcing courts to determine constitutional questions when in
terpreting statutes. See, for example, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building. & Construction Trade Council (485 U.S. 568 [1988]), which stated, “where
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such con
struction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” In addition, Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,(531 U.S. 159 [(2001]) rejected the
use of Chevron “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute would raise se
rious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such prob
lems unless the construction is plainly contrary to Congress’ intent.” Gregory v. Ashcroft
(501 U.S. 452 [1991]) applied a plain statement rule to interpret a statute to protect against
federal interference with state exercises of its sovereign powers.
47
Posner (1985) objects to the use of clear statement rules to bend the meaning of stat
utes and create a “penumbra” around the Constitution. See also, for example United
States v. Monsanto (491 U.S. 600 ([1989]), which states, “such ‘interpretive canon[s are]
not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature’ ”) (quoting
United States v. Albertini (472 U.S. 675 [1985]). Justice Kennedy wrote in his concur
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approach, courts essentially reject the best reading of statutes even
when that reading is constitutional, in an effort to make Congress explicitly address the underlying constitutional norm. At the more speciﬁc level of a particular doctrine to bolster Congress’s policymaking
primacy, the major-questions exceptions still runs into the problems
that (1) there is no objective way to separate those interpretive questions that would adopt a fundamental national policy from those that
would involve sufﬁciently mundane policy choices that would not trigger the exception, and (2) having a reviewing court resolve a major question of policy is just as much at odds with the principle under Article I
that Congress should make the decision.
Moreover, recognition of a major-question canon of statutory interpretation cannot be conﬁned to the Chevron context. Essentially, the
under-enforced norm justiﬁcation creates an independent canon that
not only may trump the Chevron “canon,” but is independent of the
Chevron doctrine. Thus, the canon would apply in those cases in which
an agency interpretation is not involved, and it is not clear how the
courts should apply the canon in that context. For example, the only
way to legitimately enforce the canon against judicial policymaking
on major questions via interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions would be to hold those provision unconstitutional and send the
matter back to Congress. But striking down statutes for leaving fundamental questions of policy unresolved is precisely what courts are
unwilling to do in the context of the nondelegation doctrine.
Nonetheless, all the Supreme Court cases supposedly announcing a
major-question exception to Chevron, except perhaps King v. Burwell
(135 S. Ct. 2480 [2015]), can best be read as instead announcing a new
presumption or clear statement rule of interpretation against fundamental changes in the preexisting regulatory status quo. In MCI (512
U.S. 218), the question was whether the FCA could support a reading
that would allow a common carrier, such as MCI, to be exempt from
tariff based rate making. The Court relied on the fundamental nature
of tariff-based regulation under the Act, and the ambiguity in the word
“modify,” to read the Act as incapable of such a reading (MCI, 512 U.S.
218).48 The fact that it did so, and thereby rejected a contrary reading
of the statute by the agency, is consistent with the Court, on its own,
rence in Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (491 U.S. 440, 472 ([1989]) that “the fact
that a particular application of the clear terms of a statute might be unconstitutional
does not provide us with a justiﬁcation for ignoring the plain meaning of the statute.”
48
The Court said in MCI (512 U.S. at 225), “The word ‘modify’ like a number of
other English words employing the root ‘mod ‘ (deriving from the Latin word for ‘mea
sure’), such as ‘moderate,’ ‘modulate,’ ‘modest,’ and ‘modicum’ has a connotation of
increment or limitation.” The Court also stated, “The tariff ﬁling requirement is . . . the
heart of the common carrier subchapter of the Communications Act” (512 U.S. at 229).
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simply reading the bounds of the statute in light of a presumption that
no interpreter, court, or agency, should use such a weak provision to allow the FCC to modify the statute and override the fundamental regulatory approach of the statute.
The Brown & Williamson opinion (529 U.S. 120) even more clearly
identiﬁes the issue as whether one could read the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act to authorize regulation of tobacco products, which Congress
had itself refused to authorize. Despite the seemingly clear language of
the statute, the Court relied on the structural misﬁt between the regulation that the statute seemed to mandate for tobacco products and some
post-Act statutory enactments in which Congress gave some regulatory
powers over cigarette labeling to the Surgeon General, to conclude that
the Act excluded tobacco products from the regulatory authority of the
FDA. This decision was not about limiting the FCC because of the place
of the agency within the executive branch, nor was it about an alternative reading that would somehow grant the FDA so much discretion
that, in some abstract sense, the grant of discretion would violate separation of powers. It was about presuming not to change the fundamental
policy that cigarette manufacturers should be free from extensive regulation such as that the FDA had adopted (529 U.S. 120). The Court
did not really reject the Chevron doctrine; it merely found the statute
clearly contrary to the agency interpretation at step one.
The same was explicitly true of the opinion in Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA (134 S. Ct. 2427 [2014]). Again, in that case, the majority
rejected the agency interpretation as contrary to the “clear” meaning of
the statute at step one of Chevron (Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct.
2427). The problem for the Court, as in Brown & Williamson, was that
the text of the Clean Air Act seems clearly to support EPA regulation of
CO2 as a criteria pollutant, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s
prior determination that CO2 was an air pollutant. As in Brown & Williamson, however, the implications of reading the statute to subject
greenhouse gasses to regulation as a pollutant for the provisions of the
Clean Air Act addressing stationary sources, would have led to extensive regulation of sources that Congress clearly did not envision when
the Act was passed. And the Court relied on this unforeseen implication, not to alter or reject the Chevron doctrine, but to require a clear
statement by Congress before it would read the statute to increase
the Clean Air Act’s permitting program by such a degree that it would
fundamentally change the extent of all federal regulation of private
entities in the United States.49 In all three of these supposed major49
As the Court stated in Utility Regulatory Air Group v. EPA (134 S. Ct. at 2444),
“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of
vast ‘economic and political signiﬁcance.’ ”
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question-exception opinions, the Court itself relied on a presumption
that Congress would have to signal clearly its intent to change fundamental regulatory requirements before the Court would read a statute
to do so.
King v. Burwell is the most troublesome case for the thesis that the
Court created a new substantive canon of interpretation independent
of Chevron rather than an exception to the Chevron doctrine. King explicitly held that it would not apply Chevron in reviewing the Internal
Revenue Service’s (IRS) interpretation of ACA because the provision
at issue was sufﬁciently signiﬁcant to abandon the presumption that
Congress implicitly delegated the implementing agency (the IRS) authority to ﬁll statutory gaps by interpretation (135 S. Ct. 2480). Thus,
unlike the other cases just discussed, King expressly created a majorquestion exception to Chevron, which I do not see any way to justify.
But looking beyond King’s determination that Chevron did not apply,
toward how the Court itself resolved the statutory question, supports
reading King as relying on a canon disfavoring interpretations that would
cause signiﬁcant dislocations of the status quo without a clear indication from Congress of intent to make that change.
The Court in King ﬁrst analyzed the text of the statute, and found that
the term “Exchange created by a State” was ambiguous regarding whether
it included a federally created “State Exchange” (135 S. Ct. at 2491).
The Court resolved the ambiguity by noting that, given the other provisions of the Act, interpreting the relevant text to exclude tax credits
to those who purchased insurance on exchanges created by the federal
government threatened to destroy health insurance markets in those
states that did not establish their own exchanges. The Court thus concluded: “It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this
manner” (135 S. Ct. at 2494). Essentially, the Court presumed that Congress would not have created an Act that potentially threatened the
viability of any health insurance markets in many states, without making its intent to do so clear. The Court essentially relied on a status
quo of workable insurance markets—whether those existing before
ACA was enacted or those whose operation would depend on ACA—
against which major change was to be measured. Having done so, reading the tax credit provision to preclude credits on federally created
exchanges threatened that status quo. Thus, the Court, entirely independent of any considerations of the Chevron doctrine, relied on a presumption against Congress intending to enact statutes that would create major changes in regulatory policy or structure to interpret the
troublesome language regarding availability of the tax credit. It could
just as easily have relied on this presumption to ﬁnd the statute unambiguous under step one of Chevron as to reason that Chevron does
not apply at all.
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So where does this analysis of the major change exception leave us?
Essentially, I have argued that there is no solid justiﬁcation for creating a major change exception to the Chevron doctrine. There is, however, an argument that could support the creation of a new substantive canon of interpretation—a canon that would disfavor reading
statutes to implement major policy shifts without a clear indication
that Congress intended the statute to make such shifts. And the Supreme Court cases supposedly creating the major-question exception
can be read to support creation of such a canon rather than creation of
an exception to Chevron. Because this exception cannot be justiﬁed
under any coherent justiﬁcation for Chevron, if one really takes seriously the necessity of making sense of Supreme Court precedent, one
could read all the major-question exceptions as creating an independent canon disfavoring major policy changes by statute. On a theoretical level, however, creating such a canon is sufﬁciently problematic
that I would suggest seeing the major-question-exceptions cases as unprincipled and would advocate minimizing their impact to the extent
possible.50
4. THE OPERATION OF CHEVRON’S STEP TWO
The ﬁnal matter that I would like to address, to which the foundation
of Chevron is relevant, is the application of step two of Chevron review. Chevron stated that the ﬁrst question courts are to ask in reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute it administers is whether
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” (467 U.S.
at 842). If the statute is “silent or ambiguous to that speciﬁc issue,” the
Court continued, then the second question is “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute” (467 U.S.
at 843). A few paragraphs later, the Court stated that courts should
not disturb the agency interpretation if it “represents a reasonable
accommodation of conﬂicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute” (467 U.S. at 845 [quoting United States
v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382–83 (1961)]). At step two, courts have alternatively seen their task as simply determining whether the agency interpretation is permissible in the sense of falling within the bounds set by
the statute, or whether the agency adequately justiﬁed its interpretation in light of the impacts of that interpretation.
I begin this part by reviewing the history of judicial treatment of the
step two inquiry. I then discuss the extent each of these approaches
50
I put myself in the camp of scholars who disfavor presumptions and clear state
ment canons to protect under enforced constitutional norms. Thus, I personally would
prefer that the Supreme Court never have started down the major question road, whether
as an exception to Chevron or as an independent canon.
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to step two is best explained by the congressional delegation of interpretive primacy justiﬁcation for Chevron.
4.1. Judicial Development of Chevron’s Step Two Inquiry
According to Ron Levin’s oft-cited article in the proper operation of
step two, early on in the history of the Chevron doctrine, the DC Circuit essentially applied the reasonable criteria by demanding the agency
to justify its interpretation as a matter of policy (Levin 1996). But as
Levin makes clear, the DC Circuit was hardly consistent in doing so.
Some DC Circuit opinions would break the interpretive inquiry into
two parts, ﬁrst asking whether the statute was silent or ambiguous either by looking only at the text of the provision at issue or by considering the question in a broader sense than evaluating the precise agency
interpretation, and then applying interpretive tools a second time to
determine whether the agency interpretation was within the bounds
of the silence or ambiguity the court identiﬁed at step one.51 And although I have not done a thorough empirical analysis, my reading of circuit court cases involving Chevron over the years suggests that other
circuits were more likely than the DC Circuit to focus on whether the
agency interpretation was permissible as an interpretive matter rather
than demanding an agency policy justiﬁcation for its interpretation.52

51
See, e.g., Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA (358 F.3d 936 [D.C. Cir. 2004]), in
which the court stated, “[U]nder Chevron ‘we must decide (1) whether the statute un
ambiguously forbids the Agency’s interpretation, and, if not, (2) whether the interpreta
tion, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the permissible.’ ” Arizona Public Service
Co. v. EPA (211 F. 3d 1280 [D.C. Cir. 2000]) also stated, “In light of the ample precedent
treating trust land as reservation land in other contexts, and the canon of statutory in
terpretation calling for statutes to be interpreted favorably towards Native American
nations, we cannot condemn as unreasonable EPA’s interpretation of ‘reservations’ to in
clude Pueblos and tribal trust land.” See also Agape v. FCC (738 F.3d 397 [D.C. Cir. 2014])
in which the court held that because the statue was ambiguous, “the FCC had latitude,
within the bounds of the statute, ‘to adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of chang
ing circumstances.’ We ﬁnd that, in promulgating the Sunset Order, the Commission acted
reasonably within the compass of its delegated authority” (quoting Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 [1991]).
52
See, e.g., Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp. (292 F.3d 1004, 1013 [(9th Cir. 2002]) in
which the court said, “Whether or not HUD’s interpretation is preferable, we cannot say
that it is impermissible.” Sidney Coal Co., Inc. v. Social Security Administration (427
F.3d 336, 346 [6th Cir. 2005]) also held that “to determine whether the SSA permissibly
construed the statute, the rules of statutory construction tell us to determine ‘(1) whether
the statute unambiguously forbids the Agency’s interpretation, and, if not, (2) whether
the interpretation, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the permissible.’ ” The First
Circuit in Lovgren v. Locke (701 F.3d 5 [1st Cir. 2012]), said at step two of Chevron, “[W]e
evaluate the agency’s interpretation under the governing standard to determine whether
it ‘exceeds the bounds of the permissible.’ ”
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Furthermore, cases that demanded reasoned decision-making usually
did not make as strict an inquiry as courts did under Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious review (see Seidenfeld 1994).
The inconsistency in judicial treatment of step two was exacerbated
somewhat by the dearth of Supreme Court step-two cases. And the
few cases that the Court did decide at step two relatively soon after
Chevron did not clearly adopt one approach or the other.53 The Court
did not squarely reverse an agency interpretation under step two until 1999 when it decided AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board (525 U.S.
366 [1999]). That case considered whether the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 authorized the FCC to require incumbent local phone companies to lease network elements to their competitors on an unbundled basis after considering whether access to proprietary elements
was “necessary” and “whether lack of access to nonproprietary elements would ‘impair’ an entrant’s ability to provide local service”
(525 U.S. at 375). The FCC determined that access to all proprietary
elements was necessary, and lack of access to all non-proprietary elements would impair entrant’s ability to compete because inability to
lease any network element would raise costs to the entrant. The Court
essentially found the terms “necessary” and “impair” to be ambiguous,
but it nonetheless determined that the statute did not envision the
FCC requiring incumbents to lease every network element. Essentially,
Iowa Utilities Board applied the permissible bounds approach to Chevron, ﬁnding, despite the ambiguity of the relevant statutory provision,
the agency interpretation fell outside the bounds of that ambiguity.
Dicta in a 2011 case, Judulang v. Holder (565 U.S. 52 [2011]), clariﬁed the Supreme Court’s view of the proper to Chevron step two.
The Judulang Court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals’s
53
A case that I wrote about previously, Rust v. Sullivan (500 U.S. 173 [1991]), had to
resolve a Chevron step two question to reach a thorny First Amendment issue that was
the true motivation for the Court granting cert in the case. With respect to the step two
question, the Court ﬁrst seemed to apply the permissible bounds variant of Chevron,
stating, “Having concluded that the plain language and legislative history are ambiguous
as to Congress’ intent in enacting Title X, we must defer to the Secretary’s permissible
construction of the statute” (500 U.S. at 187). It also found “that the Secretary amply jus
tiﬁed his change of interpretation with a ‘reasoned analysis’ ” (500 U.S. at 187). But that
reasoned analysis consisted of mere assertions that the rule better comported with con
gressional intent by avoiding confusion about what constituted use of federal funds “in
programs where abortion is a method of family planning” (500 U.S. at 191), and the agency
never analyzed the implications of the rules in terms of the effect on women choosing
abortions or more importantly on the health effects on pregnant women who might be
facing high risk pregnancies (see Seidenfeld 1994). It certainly did not demand the kind
of reasoned decision making that it had previously held courts were to demand under
arbitrary and capricious review (cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 [1983]).
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“comparable-grounds approach” for determining an alien’s eligibility
for discretionary relief from deportation was arbitrary and capricious.
In arguing the case, the government contended that the approach reﬂected an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act and
therefore should be reviewed under Chevron step two. In a footnote
rejecting the government’s contention, the Court stated, “Were we to
[apply the second step of Chevron], our analysis would be the same,
because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance’” (565 U.S. at 52 n.7).
In several subsequent cases, the Court has clearly applied something
akin to the “hard look” test at step two of Chevron. For example, in
Michigan v. EPA (135 S. Ct. 2699 [2015]), the Court rejected the interpretation of the provisions of the Clean Air Act governing hazardous
air pollutants—the NESHAPs (National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollution) program. The statute called for the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants from power plants if the agency, after
performing a study to determine the effects of other Clean Air Act regulations on power plant emissions of hazardous pollutants, found that
NESHAPs regulation was “appropriate and necessary” (42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b)). While the Court recognized that the term “appropriate and
necessary” does not precisely deﬁne when NESHAPs regulation is mandated, it held that the EPA’s determination that costs were not relevant in the agency’s decision whether to impose such regulation was
an unreasonable reading of the statute (135 S. Ct. at 2708). The Court’s
discussion focused entirely on the EPA’s policy argument that it was
sufﬁcient to consider costs when determining the categories of sources
to be regulated, and the Court did not address the relationship of costs
to the text or structure of the statutory provision except to note that
the statute said nothing about whether they should be considered
(see 135 S. Ct. 2699).
This recent Supreme Court clariﬁcation that step two of Chevron involves a similar inquiry to one the Court would conduct in an arbitraryand-capricious challenge should encourage lower courts to so view
Chevron. But, some practices die hard. In some cases, the seeming demand for reasoned decision-making at step two has led to a weird combination of this approach with the permissible bounds approach. Recently, I have seen a few cases in which a court of appeals has accepted
agency reasons for its decision at step two that are purely interpretive—that is, that do not consider policy at all but parse the statute to
argue why, although ambiguous, the agency’s reading better comports
with the meaning that Congress intended.54
54
See, e.g., Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA (846 F.3d
492 [2d Cir. 2017]), in which the court accepted an agency explanation as reasonable
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4.2. Step Two and Congressional Interpretive Delegation
Congressional delegation of agency interpretive primacy, although not
entirely inconsistent with a reasoned decision-making requirement
at step two of Chevron, does not support that requirement as well as
the judicial self-limitation foundation. One can certainly argue that
even if Congress assigns interpretive primacy over a statute an agency
administers to the agency, that does not preclude Congress from intending that the agency have to give reasons for its interpretation, and
that the courts review such reasons. After all, statutes delegate policymaking authority to agencies, most commonly by authorizing agency
rulemaking, and at least since 1984, the Supreme Court has found that
courts are to demand reasoned decision-making—and in fact to engage in something akin to hard-look review—in evaluating whether
the agency policy is arbitrary and capricious (see Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 [1983]).
But there is a difference between interpretation and policymaking,
even if the former may be fraught with the latter. Interpretation involves choosing between different plausible readings of a statute. Unlike rulemaking, interpretation is something that the courts can (and,
some would say, usually would be expected to) do.55 By concluding that
Congress has given interpretive primacy to the agency, proponents of
the congressional delegation foundation have essentially conceded that
a court is not to substitute its interpretation for that of the agency
unless it ﬁnds the agency interpretation out of the bounds of meaning
permitted by the statute.56 But this is the very description of the permissible bounds approach to Chevron step two.
and permissible even though the explanation was largely based on the agency analysis
of the statutory text and legislative history. The Ninth Circuit in Delago v. Holder
(648 F.3d 1095 [(9th Cir. 2011]) also held the Board of Immigration Appeals’s interpre
tation permissible based on its construction of the statutory text and history. In Vil
lage of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650 [D.C. Cir. 2011]), the court
accepted the Board’s justiﬁcations based on legislative history and interpretation.
55
See, for example, Farina (1989), who states, “It is surely a far more remarkable step
than Chevron acknowledged to number among Congress’s constitutional prerogatives
the power to compel courts to accept and enforce another entity’s view of legal meaning
whenever the law is ambiguous.” Sunstein (1989) also explains that “an independent ar
biter should determine the nature of [statutory] limitation [on an agency].”
56
See, for example, Judge Gorsuch’s concurrence in Gutierrez Brizuela v. Lynch (834
F. 3d 1142 [10th Cir. 2016]), in which he explained that “[b]y Brand X’s own telling, . . .
a judicial declaration of the law’s meaning in a case or controversy before it is not ‘author
itative,’ . . . but is instead subject to revision by a politically accountable branch of govern
ment.” Conversely, Monaghan (1983) argues that legislative delegation of interpretive
primacy is consistent with the courts’ role to say what the law is so long as the agency
acts as Congress’s lawmaking agent. See also, Strauss (2012), who proposes that Chevron
leaves to courts the determination of the interpretive space within which the ultimate
agency construction of the statute must fall.
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One might similarly argue, however, that judicial review for reasoned decision-making at step two is also inconsistent with the judicial self-restraint justiﬁcation for Chevron. In my previous article on
Chevron’s foundation, I addressed this argument and concluded otherwise (Seidenfeld 2011).
At ﬁrst blush, grounding Chevron on the self-restraint principle of
Article III would seem to preclude the court from demanding the agency
to explain its interpretation. Choosing interpretations from those allowed by a statute seem more akin to policymaking than to divinations of statutory meaning. A court that actively reviews agency interpretations to ensure that they are reasoned thus threatens to interfere
with the policymaking prerogatives of the agency more directly than
does a court that simply defers to discretionary choices of statutory
meaning.
The potential impact of my Article III grounding, however, is
more nuanced than this intuition would suggest. Recall that the
Article III foundation is premised on the agency having institutional potential, due to its expertise and accountability, to reach
a superior interpretation. Achieving that potential depends on
the agency engaging in a deliberative process that, at a minimum,
considers the implications of plausible interpretations and clariﬁes the agency’s value judgments in reaching the one it chooses.
Judicial demands to ensure that the agency fulﬁlled this obligation will vary with the precise question addressed. Some interpretations will have sufﬁciently little signiﬁcance that they warrant
abbreviated agency consideration. Even for those that have significant implications, the facts and reasoning necessary to support
the agency choice will depend on the complexity of the issue and
the plausibility of the various interpretive options in light of various interpretive factors such as canons of interpretation and legislative history. Hence, some interpretations might be reasonable
without the agency having considered every potential aspect of
the question, while for others the inquiry required by full-blown
hard look review might be necessary. Most signiﬁcantly, under
the Article III foundation, the court must review the agency reasoning process not to satisfy § 706 of the APA, but rather to satisfy the courts’ responsibility over questions of law. That responsibility can both demand self-restraint and mandate an active role
at step two so long as that role is one of agency oversight and not
substitution of judicial value judgments. (Seidenfeld 2011, 310–11)
One ﬁnal word regarding step two and “Chevron’s Foundation” addresses those courts which have applied the reasoned decision-making
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requirement to agency interpretive explanations.57 This may appear
to be a reasonable basis to uphold an agency interpretation on a matter that does not hold much signiﬁcance. It would be perverse to require the agency to engage in the same intensity of policy-oriented
explanation for a decision with little signiﬁcance;58 in fact, such a judicial expectation could prompt an agency to devote more resources
to justify an interpretation than any economic effect the interpretation
is likely to have. Agency explanation of its decision as a purely interpretive matter does not usually entail the devotion of signiﬁcant resources. Hence, the agency will be attracted to meeting the reasoned
decision-making requirement at step two by providing interpretive
reasons. But, this unusual implementation of the reasoned decisionmaking requirement is not supported by either of Chevron’s two competing foundations.
The congressional-delegation foundation for Chevron does not justify judicial review of an agency’s purely statutory reasoning. Judicial
determination of whether Congress delegated interpretive primacy to
the implementing agency—that is, whether the statute is silent or ambiguous—inherently focuses on interpretative reasoning. But once a
court has determined that the agency interpretation falls within the
bounds permitted by the statute, there would be little beneﬁt for
the courts to review that interpretation. In essence, the court has already determined that the agency reading of the statute is reasonable
as an interpretive matter by virtue that it falls within the ambit permitted by the statute. If the agency explanation is less convincing to
the court than the court’s own determination that the interpretation falls within allowable bounds, it would be perverse for the court
to remand. Presumably the agency would simply repeat the reviewing court’s step-one interpretive analysis, and thereby satisfy the court
that the interpretive choice was reasonable.
The foundation grounded in judicial self-limitation explicitly invokes
an aversion to judicial policymaking to justify reasoned decision-making
at step two. By doing so, it explicitly posits that ﬁlling in statutory gaps
will implicate the courts in policymaking, and hence that the role of
ﬁlling such gaps properly belongs to the agency (see Seidenfeld 2011).
57
By “interpretive explanation,” I mean an explanation that relies on the process of
construing the language of the statute rather than on assessing the policy implications of
various alternative interpretations. Thus, such explanations will rely on canons of inter
pretations, dictionaries, perhaps legislative history, and generally the same tools on
which a court might rely were it to interpret the statute in the ﬁrst instance.
58
Gersen and Vermeule (2016) argue that satisfaction of arbitrary and capricious re
view is much simpler than scholars have indicated; it simply requires an agency give a
reason for an action and the depth of that explanation is based on a variety of factors in
cluding cost and size of the issue.
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Judicial inquiry should review agency policy justiﬁcations for agency
actions to ensure that the agency considered the implications of its
interpretation carefully and deliberatively. This calls for judicial review grounded in requiring the agency to think through the policy
implications of its interpretation—the outcomes that will likely follow from the interpretation and an explanation of why those outcomes justify the interpretation. The reasons for demanding such an
explanation are the same as to those that justify hard-look review, which
courts impose under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review
of agency action (see Seidenfeld 2012). But reasoned decision-making
akin to arbitrary-and-capricious review need not be gratuitously onerous. In fact, the level of scrutiny should reﬂect the cost to the agency
of developing a sufﬁcient policy analysis compared to the stakes affected
by the interpretation (see Gersen and Vermeule 2016). Hence, for interpretations of small consequence under the judicial self-limitation
foundation, agencies should still attempt to justify their interpretations in terms of policy implications rather than as a purely interpretive matter, understanding that the agency can reason that developing further information or analysis is not likely to be worth the cost
of doing so.
One might posit a principle related to the aversion of judicial policymaking—that even with respect to interpretative explanations, agencies are superior to courts—potentially to justify why courts should
credit purely interpretive arguments as constituting valid reasoned
decision-making at step two of Chevron. Agencies may be better at
the interpretive endeavor, at least for statutes of relatively recent vintage, because they are involved in the legislative drafting process and
hence better understand the intent of Congress behind the statutory
provisions at issue (see Vermeule 2006; Strauss 1990; Walker 2015).
In addition, the agency may have its ﬁnger on the pulse of current congressional preferences, and it may even understand that interpreting
a statute contrary to such preferences may sacriﬁce aspects of the agency
program due to potential congressional reaction such as cutting agency
funding or engaging in agency oversight hearings.59 I do not doubt that
those are legitimate motivations for the agency to choose one interpretation over another. But recent focus on public meaning of law suggests that such inside knowledge should not determine the meaning
of otherwise ambiguous statutes (see Nelson 2007). I do not mean to
imply that an agency cannot take such inside information into account when interpreting a statute it implements. Rather, I see those
59
See Jacobs (2014), who uses arguments from Alexander Bickel’s “Least Danger
ous Branch” arguments to argue for allowing agencies to avoid taking action that
might trigger congressional reactions adverse to the agency’s overall program.
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concerns as primarily political, and independent of appropriate judicial focus. Hence, as I have expressed regarding judicial review under
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, although political considerations
may motivate an agency interpretation that is otherwise legitimate,
they may not legitimate agency decisions that otherwise are not legitimate (see Seidenfeld 2012). And, for me, the agency must be able
to justify its interpretation as a matter of policy for it to be legitimate.
Hence, an agency may take into account the intent of the enacting Congress or the preferences of the current Congress, which it discerns based
on its special involvement in the legislative process, but that intent
should not be the foundation of the agency’s justiﬁcation for its interpretive choice. Rather, the agency should see its primary interpretive task
as choosing an interpretation that best implements the policy underlying the overall statutory scheme the agency administers.60
5. CONCLUSION
This article has provided an opportunity for me to update my evaluation of congressional delegation of interpretive primacy as the most
persuasive rationale for the Chevron doctrine. Despite several signiﬁcant articles that suggest that this rationale for the doctrine is better
supported than it appeared when I last addressed this matter, I have
concluded that the delegation rationale is still problematic as a justiﬁcation for the Chevron doctrine, In addition, I considered how well
that rationale might justify recent developments in the Chevron doctrine—in particular the development of a major-question exception
to Chevron and the developing consensus that step two of Chevron incorporates something akin to hard-look review of agency statutory interpretation. Whether one thinks those developments are good, the
delegation rationale for Chevron is hard pressed to justify them. Thus,
I end up close to where I started before writing this paper: I am skeptical
that the congressional delegation justiﬁcation for Chevron reﬂects actual congressional intent, and I ﬁnd that it fails to explain recent developments in the doctrine.
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